Hamilton and Gallipoli: British Command in an Age of Military Transformation by McGilvray Evan

Author:McGilvray, Evan
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: HISTORY / Military / World War I
ISBN: 9781473854932
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Published: 2015-02-26T16:00:00+00:00

Chapter Seven

An Unfair Withdrawal?

The dismissal of General Sir Ian Hamilton and the subsequent evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula were driven mainly by politics and the word of two journalists, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and Keith Murdoch. However, as Hamilton observed later, the Dardanelles was one of the finest things to come out of the (1914–1918) war, ‘but when the ammunition was not forthcoming it was doomed’.1 Hamilton was largely correct in his assertion, but there were other factors which had also caused the Gallipoli operation to fail which perhaps Hamilton could have addressed and ensured the success of the operation. A constant criticism which Hamilton failed to address was that of his Staff and himself seemingly leading the entire operation at Gallipoli from safety and leaving others to take the risk. This view was quite prominent amongst the Australian forces serving at Gallipoli.

General John Monash was quite cutting about British Staff serving far from the Front at Sarpi Camp on the island of Lemnos. In a letter home, Monash described how he saw the ‘cult of inefficiency and muddle and red-tape practised to a nicety’. He noted many officers earning their campaign medals on board luxurious ships and wearing all manner of patches, armbands and lace with somewhat dubious titles which he facetiously described as ‘deputy-assistant-acting-inspector-general-of-something-or-other’. Then taking a more serious tone, Monash considered the sacrifice of the Australian troops at Gallipoli in reference to a debate in the Australian Parliament in which Australian politicians questioned why Australian troops were being treated in ‘Tommy Hospitals’. This was in reference to British military hospitals rather than Australian, New Zealand or Canadian hospitals. The implication was that the British hospitals were somewhat inferior and the ‘sooner they hang somebody for gross mismanagement the better’.2 Monash was thoroughly peeved with the entire situation between the British High Command and the ANZACs.

Next, Monash attacked the entire Dardanelles campaign. He considered that the entire operation was flawed from March 1915 when the Allies launched its naval assault against Turkish forts along the Dardanelles Straits. This gave the enemy adequate notice of where the Allies intended to land a military force. Furthermore, Monash claimed that the Allies had more or less told the Turks the date and place of the landings.3 The British historian Peter Liddell noted that secrecy was not a priority of the British in 1915 and that at least one soldier from 29th Division sent a postcard home with the note ‘leaving for the Dardanelles on Tuesday.’4 Robert Rhodes James claims that the Allied naval attack and destruction of Turkish forts at Sedd-el-Behr on 3 November 1914 also alerted the Turks to the intentions of the Allies. The British, as a consequence of their ‘effortless destruction’ of the Turkish guns, made them over confident in later attacks on the Turks.5 Of the eventual landings, Monash described them as only being adequate to secure a landing base and then hold it defensively.

Between 25 April 1915 and 15 August 1915, according to Monash it took the resources

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